Fordham Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 5

Article 1

2004

Symposium: Rawls and the Law: Editors' Foreword

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Symposium: Rawls and the Law: Editors' Foreword, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1381 (2004).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SYMPOSIUM

RAWLS AND THE LAW
Editors' Foreword
On November 7th and 8th, 2003, Fordham University School of
Law held the third in a series of conferences in constitutional and
legal theory,' entitled "Rawls and the Law." Professor John Rawls of
Harvard University is widely regarded as the most important political
philosopher of the twentieth century. As James E. Fleming, Professor
of Law at Fordham, and the organizer of this conference, observed in
his introductory remarks:
Many talk about how important Rawls's work is, not only for
its substantive contributions to political philosophy but also
for its very revival of political philosophy itself. Indeed, his
work has inspired people to believe that we can reason and
make arguments about justice rather than merely express our
subjective opinions and the like. More than that, Rawls's
work is inspiring and instructive as a model of how to
construct a theory (and a magisterial one at that)!
Many also talk about Rawls's humility, which of course itself
was inspiring. But his humility was not merely a personal and
professional virtue. It also applied to his wisdom in judging
what we can expect from a theory (even a monumental and
magisterial theory like his own). He was not daunted if a
theory could not do everything that one might hope for it or
that a critic might demand of it.
The focus of this conference is on the implications of Rawls's
work for law. Now, you might think, surely that has all been
thoroughly worked over. But it has not. Let me give you a
graphic illustration of that. Five of Rawls's seven books have
been published in the last five years,2 and a sixth, Political
1. See Symposium, Fidelity in ConstitutionalTheory, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1247,
1247-818 (1997); Symposium, The Constitution and the Good Society, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 1569, 1569-2200 (2001).
2. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999); John Rawls, Collected Papers
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999); John
Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Barbara Herman ed., 2000);
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Another
book, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, is being edited by Samuel
Freeman.
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Liberalism, was originally published in 1993. (We must thank
several people, Mardy Rawls, Samuel Freeman, Erin Kelly,
and Barbara Herman, for all their work in bringing these five
recent books to publication.) Only the first edition of A
Theory of Justice, originally published in 1971, has been
thoroughly worked over. Much work remains to be done not
only with A Theory of Justice but also these other works. We
hope to do some of that work in this conference.
While there have been a number of conferences or symposia on
Rawls's individual books-such as A Theory of Justice (1971) and
Political Liberalism (1993), 3 there have been none with this
conference's focus-to explore the implications of Rawls's work for
the law. Over thirty outstanding scholars gathered for the Fordham
conference.
Professor Ronald Dworkin delivered the keynote
address. The conference was organized into seven panels, whose
presentations and deliberations were guided by the following themes:
Panel 1: The Constitutional Essentials of PoliticalLiberalism.
What are the implications of Rawls's conceptions of justice as
fairness and political liberalism for constitutional theory?
Might his account of constitutional essentials provide a useful
guiding framework for conceiving the scheme of basic liberties
embodied in the American Constitution? How thin are the
commitments of our Constitution as compared with our richer
commitments to constitutional justice and political justice?
What are the implications of Rawls's work for theory of
judicial review and for enforcement of constitutional rights
and obligations outside the courts through legislative and
executive institutions?
Panel 2: Equal Citizenship: Gender. Are Rawls's conceptions
of justice as fairness and political liberalism compatible withindeed, do they require-a liberal feminism that is committed
to securing the status of equal citizenship for women? Do
they obligate the government to eradicate the vestiges of
gender subordination? Does Rawls adequately grapple with
feminist critiques of his theory? Can a Rawlsian political
liberalism simply incorporate liberal feminist arguments, such
as those exemplified by Susan Moller Okin's Justice, Gender
3. See, e.g., Symposium, John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
549 (1994); Symposium, Political Liberalism, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1813 (1994);
Symposium, John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 75 Pac. Philosophical Q. 165, 165-387
(1994); Symposium on John Rawls, 105 Ethics 4 (1994); Symposium, Rawlsian Theory
of Justice: Recent Developments, 99 Ethics 695 (1989); Symposium, John Rawls' A
Theory of Justice, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 486 (1973). See also, though not officially
denominated a symposium, the three articles in one issue: Frank I. Michelman, In
Pursuit of ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973); Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1020 (1973); D.J. Bentley, John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1070 (1973).
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and the Family? What does justice as fairness entail for
regulation of the family?
Panel 3: Equal Citizenship: Race and Ethnicity. One might
readily assume that Rawls's conceptions of justice as fairness
and political liberalism are committed to a robust principle of
equal citizenship for all, whatever one's race or ethnicity. Yet
one might ask, as Seana Shiffrin does, "Why does Rawls say
so little about race?
And why has nobody noticed?"
Furthermore, why have scholars of race and ethnicity said so
little about Rawls? To put the issues differently, why has no
one done for Rawls and race what Okin did for Rawls and
gender? What would a Rawlsian conception of racial justice
look like? Would it differ in significant respects from leading
available anti-caste or anti-subordination conceptions of racial
equality?
Panel 4: The Law of Peoples. What are we to make of
Rawls's The Law of Peoples in relation to A Theory of
Justice? Before Rawls wrote The Law of Peoples, one might
reasonably have expected that his conception of justice as
fairness would yield a strong universalist, cosmopolitan
conception of international human rights. Does Rawls in The
Law of Peoples set his sights too low, e.g., by tolerating merely
decent peoples and by accepting regimes that fall too far short
of realizing the commitments of justice as fairness and to
honoring international human rights? What more generally
are the implications of The Law of Peoples for international
law, international human rights, multiculturalism, and
immigration?
Panel 5: Tort. Might Rawls's conception of justice as fairness
underwrite fairness or reciprocity theories of tort law that are
superior-both as normative and descriptive accounts-to
utilitarian or efficiency theories? Does Rawls's account of the
basic structure of a just society leave open the question of how
systems of private law should be structured, or does it entail a
certain basic structure of private law? Does his analysis of
"reasonableness"
(as opposed to "rationality") yield
important insights into the "reasonable person" standard of
negligence law? Rawls has revitalized and dominated the
theory of distributive justice; much of law, including torts,
appears concerned with corrective justice; what is the relation
between distributive justice and corrective justice?
Panel 6: Property, Taxation, and Distributive Justice. Do
Rawls's conceptions of distributive justice and defense of the
difference principle have implications for tax law and property
law? What measures might offer a reasonable likelihood of
better realizing such commitments than do current
arrangements and proposals on the political table?
A
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conception of justice in taxation as developed by Thomas
Nagel and Liam Murphy? A stakeholder society scheme as
proposed by Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott? To what
extent are efforts to provide tax incentives for socially
constructive activities, e.g., rearing children, consistent with
Rawlsian conceptions of fairness?
Panel 7:
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. What
constraints does Rawls's idea of pubic reason impose upon
political and legal justification in a constitutional democracy
such as our own?
What form should constitutional
interpretation by courts take in circumstances of reasonable
moral pluralism? Is the Supreme Court, as Rawls suggested,
How do or should
an "exemplar of public reason"?
legislatures and executives, too, exemplify public reason?
How inclusive or exclusive should the idea of public reason be
with respect to religious arguments grounded solely in
comprehensive moral conceptions? What implications does
the idea of public reason have for interpretation of the
religion clauses of the United States Constitution?
The Fordham Law Review is honored to publish the papers
presented, augmented and revised in many cases in light of the
colloquy that followed each panel, as well as the Keynote Address,
Rawls and the Law, delivered by Professor Ronald Dworkin. The
issue, for the most part, follows the order and organization of the
conference.
We would like to thank Dean William Michael Treanor for his
ongoing support of the Law Review; the Fordham Law School Office
of Academic Programs, in particular Helen Herman and Darin Neely,
for their help in the planning and administering of this conference;
and the Fordham Law School Library Administration and Staff, in
particular Paul Miller, Reference Librarian, for his enthusiastic
assistance in the publication of this conference. A number of
Fordham Professors moderated panels and contributed papers:
Michael Baur, Martin S. Flaherty, James E. Fleming, Sheila R. Foster,
Abner S. Greene, Tracy E. Higgins, Charles A. Kelbley, Linda F.
Sugin, and Benjamin C. Zipursky. We acknowledge and greatly
appreciate the presence of Margaret Fox Rawls at the conference, and
thank her for providing us with her painting of Professor Rawls
included in this issue. Our deepest gratitude is to Professor James E.
Fleming, who conceived of the conference and served as its organizer.
In addition to working closely with the Editors in the production of
this issue of the Fordham Law Review, Professor Fleming's service
this year as Moderator to the journal is truly invaluable.

